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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT,
& ESPLIN,
Case No. 92-A-0247
Petitioner,
vs,

Priority No, 7

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Department of Employment
Security,
Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BECAUSE IT WAS
DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY OF PRESENTING EVIDENCE DURING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DETERMINATION OF THE FEE AWARD, AND
AGAIN WHEN THE BOARD OF REVIEW CONSIDERED THE CLAIM WITHOUT
HAVING THE RECORD AND WITHOUT ALLOWING PETITIONER A HEARING
The Administrative
evidence that supported

Law Judge

(ALJ) did

not

Petitioner's attorney1s

consider

any

fees claim for

services provided to the underlying claimant, Abraham Karbakhsh, in
the unusually lengthy proceeding against his employer.

Petitioner

simply

was

submitted

an

itemized

billing

statement

and

never

allowed a hearing or an opportunity to present affidavits or other
evidence to support its claim.

In determining Petitioner's rights,

the ALJ relied solely upon the 25% limitation and the limited
evidence available to him.
Respondent clearly admits that the ALJ decided upon the issue
1

of

Petitioner's

claim

for

attorney's

(Respondent's brief at 5.)
Review

(Board)

and

fees

on

June

2,

1992.

Petitioner appealed to the Board of
Board affirmed the ALJ f s decision on

the

July 27, 1992.

(Respondent's brief at 5.)

It is instructive to

reiterate

the

which

that

underlying

proceeding

gave

rise

to

Petitioner's claim was legal representation of Abraham Karbakhsh.
Karbakhsh's

claim

March 26, 1992.
the Board.

was

denied

by

the ALJ in a decision dated

(Respondent's brief at 4. ) Karbakhsh appealed to

"A full transcript of the matter could not be made for

the Board of Review, however, as some of the tapes made of the
hearing were defective.

The Board of Review remanded the matter to

the ALJ in order to collect testimony and cross-examination lost
due to the defective tapes."
to the record omitted.)

(Respondent's brief at 4, citations

The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision on

September 28, 1992.
Despite
Karbakhsh's

not

being

hearing,

in

the

possession
Board

of

decided

Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees.

even
upon

the

record

of

the

merits

of

Furthermore, Petitioner

was not permitted to present its own evidence even at this time.
Again, the Board of Review chose to determine Petitioner's rights
without providing a fair hearing or even the slightest opportunity
to present evidence tending to support its claim.

Respondent's

assertion that the Board acted justifiably and gave Petitioner a
proper hearing truly

stretches the limits of logic, since the

Petitioner was afforded absolutely no opportunity to present its
case and the Board itself did not even have the record of the

2

hearings at the time. What forms the basis of the Board's decision
is simply a mechanical application of the 25% rule, with total
disregard to the individual facts of the underlying proceeding or
the merits of Petitioner's claim.
Given the incontrovertible fact that the Board acted in the
absence of pertinent information, indeed the actual record of the
underlying proceedings, and did not allow Petitioner any hearing
whatsoever to defend its claim, Petitioner's due process rights
were violated.
POINT II
PETITIONER WAS PRECLUDED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW FROM INTRODUCING
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM TO SAFEGUARD ITS DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
Respondent's brief (at 23), refers to the §35-4-10(i) of the
Utah Employment Security Act as providing the requisite authority
that

would

introducing
rights.
granted

have

allowed

additional

Respondent
under

said

Petitioner

to

request

the

Board

for

evidence to safeguard their due process

further argues that despite the
section,

Petitioner

did

authority

not avail

of

this

provision, and implies that Petitioner should not be allowed to
raise the due process argument now, when it arguably did not raise
it

at

the

Respondent's

proper

time.

reference

consulting with counsel

to

(Respondent's
§35-4-10(i)

is

brief
erroneous

for Respondent, Petitioner

citation should have been §35-4-10(1).

at

22-24.)

and

after

learned the

Furthermore, Petitioner did

attempt to secure a hearing to introduce evidence in support of its
claim by writing directly

to the Board
3

of Review but was not

allowed a fair hearing or any proper opportunity to present its
case (Page 6 of the Record).
A.

Respondent's reference to §35-4-10(1) of the Utah
Employment Security Act as providing the authority for a
request to the Board of Review to hear additional
evidence is totally inappropriate

To begin with, Respondent's concession that Petitioner could
have made the due

process

argument

under

§35-4-10(1),

albeit

defective, does concede that Petitioner's due process rights were
violated.

Section 35-4-10(1) reads in pertinent part as follows:

A review of a decision or determination involving
contribution liability or applications for refund shall
be
made
by
the
commission
or
its
authorized
representative in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter. The decision of the representative conducting
the review is considered the decision of the commission.
The
commission
or
its
authorized
representative
conducting the review may refer the matter to an
administrative law judge, may decide the application for
review on the basis of any facts and information as may
be obtained, or may, in its discretion, hear argument or
hold a hearing to secure further facts.
After the
review, notice of the decision shall be given to the
employing unit. (Emphasis added).
"Employing unit" as used in the above provision is defined in
§35-4-22.1 and is generally any individual or legal entity

who has

one or more individuals performing services for it within this
state.

"Employing unit" in no wise refers to either the underlying

claimant or the attorneys representing the claimant, as is the
situation in the instant case.

"Contribution liability" clearly

refers to an employer who has been found liable for payment of
unemployment
Similarly,

taxes
"refund"

and

who

refers

is
to

contesting
a

liable

such

a

liability.

employer

contesting

liability for past or future payments to the employee.
4

Therefore, the above section is limited by its terms for the
purposes of reviewing claims involving contribution liability or
applications for refund of employer or employing unit liability.
This section has absolutely no application to the case at hand
since

it is irrelevant

to the claim

of a claimant's

attorney

requesting a hearing to introduce additional evidence regarding
fees charged and affording them due process.
B.

The Board did not allow Petitioner any hearing even after
Petitioner had protested the ALJ's decision to the Board

Respondent asserts that

,f

[I]n the present case the attorneys

never requested that the matter be remanded to the ALJ to accept
evidence with regard to their fee,...."
24.)
to

(Respondent's brief at

On the contrary, Petitioner definitely appealed to the Board

reverse

the

decision

of

the

ALJ

on

the

issue

of

fees.

Petitioner's letter of June 12, 1992, (Respondent's brief, exhibit
at appendix B, pages 4-5), clearly

indicated to the Board the

Petitioner's concerns regarding the unfairness of the decision.
Under the Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-2(3), (appendix A - l ) ,
an appeal to the Board of Review from a decision of an ALJ should
be on an appeal form and must include the name of the appellant,
the

name

and

social

security

number

of

the

claimant,

the

identification of the case on which the appeal is being made, and
the grounds upon which the appeal is being made.
Petitioner's appeal of June 12, 1992, was made on its own
letterhead
every

instead of a departmental

single

element

grounds for the appeal.

required

form but clearly

by R562-10d-2(3),

(Appendix B, 1.)
5

included

including

the

Despite this notice, the

Board determined upon Petitioner's rights without even the benefit
of the record of the underlying proceeding, and without providing
a hearing to the Petitioner.
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-3(2)(a) clearly states that
11

[I] f the Board determines that additional evidence offered by a

party was not available at the time of the hearing, the Board may
remand

the matter to an Administrative

hearing."
protection
Petitioner.

In

for

further

due

process

hearing whatsoever was not provided

to the

this

of any

case,

even

the

Law Judge

bare

minimum

Typically, the determination of attorney's fees is

made after the underlying disputes have been resolved.

In the

instant case, Petitioner was never afforded that hearing or any
other

opportunity

to present

its

case

because

its

claim

was

resolved before the underlying dispute of the claimant, Abraham
Karbakhsh, and without the benefit of the record of that dispute.
Therefore, the Board violated the Petitioner's due process rights.
POINT III
RESPONDENT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF FACTUAL INACCURACIES IN THE
BOARD'S ATTORNEY'S FEES DECISION AS MERE DICTA IS NOT ONLY
INAPPROPRIATE BUT ALSO REAFFIRMS PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
BOARD ACTED UNFAIRLY AND ARBITRARILY
Petitioner's earlier brief argues at length that the decision
of the Board was not based upon any
therefore should not be sustained.

facts

in the record

and

The decision of the Board

totally failed to point out any evidence in the record that was
used to objectively determine the validity of Petitioner's claim.
This supports Petitioner's argument that the Board acted without
the

benefit

of

any

record

and
6

solely

on

the

strength

of

Respondent's evidence.

In fact, the reasons that were forwarded by

the Board in justifying its decision were remarkably vague for the
most

part

and

completely

inaccurate

in

certain

instances.

Petitioner has already objected to all these inaccuracies in its
earlier brief.

(Petitioner's brief at 23-25.)

Respondent attempts to waive away Petitioner's objections by
claiming that these inaccuracies were mere]y dicta and did not form
the basis of the Board's decision.

(Respondent's brief at 10-12.)

Respondent's tacit admission about the inaccuracy of the Board's
findings regarding the extent of Petitioner's services and the
nature and complexity

of the proceedings that generated

those

services, immediately raises serious doubts about the fairness of
the Board's decision.
Although Respondent characterizes the inaccuracies as dicta,
it still

cannot

offer

any

evidence

that

the

Board

decision solely upon facts contained in the record.

based

its

Therefore,

Petitioner's claim that the Board's decision is not based upon
facts solely contained in the record is further validated.
POINT IV
THE CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF SUSTAINING
THE 2 5% RULE IN INSTANT CASE IS INAPPOSITE AND UNRELATED TO
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT
Respondent has devoted a considerable portion of its brief to
the case of Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985),
and explaining

its significance to instant case.

Petitioner did not have a contingent
underlying claimant Karbakhsh.

Unlike Roa,

fee arrangement with the

This alone distinguishes Roa from
7

the present fact situation.

Further, in this case, the statute

provides that a greater fee may be allowed if necessary to protect
the due process rights of the claimant at the extraordinary initial
hearing.

Petitioner clearly would have no basis for this appeal

had the initial hearing gone only a few hours.

However, since the

hearing was continued twice and extended for more than 13 hours of
hearing the Due Process Rights of the Claimant with respect to the
Anti-discrimination Claim referred to at page 177 to 191 of the
record or the wrongful discharge claim.

Furthermore, unlike Roa,

Petitioner is not challenging the constitutional validity of the
25% rule, only the Board's application of the rule in instant case
where the exception provided to the rule should have been employed.
Respondent's

use

of

National

Association

of

Radiation

Survivors et. al. v. Edward V. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583 (1993), is
similarly unsuitable because it does not relate to the protection
of the due process rights of the parties involved.
DATED this 7th day of March, 1994.

yWS P. T U G A ^
7
attorney for Petitioner

GARY' Et/ WE*OfaT
(J
Attorney fj#r Petitioner
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
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day of March, 1994.
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-22.1
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-2(3)
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-3(2)(a)

10

35-4-22.1

LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

other state as a part of a state-controlled system of
public employment offices or by a federal agency
charged with the administration of an unemployment
compensation progTam or free public employment offices
(8) "Employment Security Administration Fund"
means the Employment Security Administration
Fund established by Section 35-4-14, and from which
administrative expenses under this chapter shajl be
paid
(9) "Extended benefits" has the meaning specified
in Subsection 35-4-3.5(g)(6)
(10) "Fund" means the Unemployment Compensation Fund established by this chapter
(11) 'Insured average annual wage" means on or
before the 15th day of May of each year, the total
wages of insured workers for the preceding calendar
year, divided by the average monthly number of insured workers, determined by dividing by 12 the total
insured workers for the preceding calendar year as
determined under the rules of the commission calculated to two decimal places, disregarding any fraction
of one cent
(12) "Insured average fiscal year wage" means on
or before the 15th day of November of each year, the
total wages of insured workers for the preceding fiscal year, divided by the average monthly number of
insured workers, determined by dividing by 12 the
total insured workers for the preceding fiscal year as
determined under the rules of the commission calculated to two decimal places, disregarding any fraction
of one cent
(13) "Insured average fiscal year weekly wage"
means the insured average fiscal year wage determined in Subsection (12), divided by 52, calculated to
two decimal places, disregarding any fraction of one
cent
(14) "Insured average weekly wage" means the insured average annual wage determined in Subsection
(11), divided by 52, calculated to two decimal places,
disregarding any fraction of one cent
(15) "Insured status" means that an individual
has, during his base-period, performed services and
earned wages in employment sufficient to qualify for
benefits under Section 35-4-4
(16) "Insured work" means employment for employers
(17) "Monetary base period wage requirement"
means Sc/e of the insured average fiscal year wage for
the preceding fiscal year, for example, fiscal year
1990 for individuals establishing benefit years in
1991, rounded up to the next higher multiple of $100
(18) "State" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia
(19) "Week" means the period or periods of seven
consecutive calendar days as the commission may
pi escribe by rule
1993
35-4-22.1. E m p l o y i n g u n i t s .
(1) "Employing unit' means any individual or type
of organization including any partnership, association, trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance
company, or corporation, whether domestic or foreign, or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee
or successor of any of the foregoing, or the legal representative of a deceased person, which has or subsequent to J a n u a r y 1, 1935, had one or more individuals performing services for it within this state
(2) All individuals performing services within this
state for any employing unit which maintains two or
more separate establishments within this state are

382

considered to be performing services for a single employing unit for ail the purposes of this chapter
(3) Each individual employed to perform or to assist in performing the work of any person in the service of an employing unit is considered to be engaged
b\ the employing unit for all the purposes of this
chapter whether the individual was hired or paid directly by the employing unit or by the person, provided the employing unit had actual or constructive
knowledge of the work
(4) "Hospital" means an institution which is licensed, certified, or approved by the Department of
Health as a hospital
(5) "Institution of higher education," for the purposes of this section, means an educational institution which
(a) d) admits, as regular students only, individuals having a certificate of graduation
from a high school or the recognized equivalent of a certificate,
(n) is legally authorized in this state to
provide a program of education beyond high
school,
(in) provides an educational program for
which it awards a bachelor's or higher degree, or provides a program which is acceptable for full credit toward t h a t degree, a program of postgraduate or postdoctoral studies,
or a program of training to prepare students
for gainful employment in a recognized occupation, and
dv) is a public or other nonprofit institution
(b) All colleges and universities in this state
are institutions of higher education for purposes
of this section.
(6) (a) "Temporary services employer" or "leasing
employer" is an employing unit that contracts
with clients or customers to supply workers to
perform services for the client or customer and
directly or indirectly performs the following functions
d) negotiates with clients or customers for
matters such as time, place, type of work,
working conditions, quality, and price of the
services,
(n) determines assignments or reassignments of workers even though workers retain the right to refuse specific assignments,
(in) retains the authority to assign or reassign a worker to other clients or customers
when a worker is determined unacceptable
by a specific client or customer,
dv) sets the rate of pay of the worker
whether or not through negotiation,
(v) pays the worker from its own account,
and
(vi) retains the right to hire and terminate workers
(b) If an individual or entity contracts to suppl\ an employee to perform services for a customer or client and is a leasing employer or a
temporary services employer, the individual or
entity is the employer of the employee who performs the services If the individual or entity is
not a leasing employer or a temporary services
employer, it pays the wages as the agent of the
employer
(c) In circumstances in which an employee is
loaned from one employer to another employer,
and direction and control of the manner and
means of performing the services changes to the

R562-10d-2. Appeals to the Board.
1. Appeals as of Right
If the Administrative Law Judge's decision did not affirm a prior
decision, the Board will accept a timely appeal from any party to
that decision.
2. Appeals Not Accepted by the Board
The Board of Review has the discretion not to accept an appeal if
the decision
of the Administrative Law Judge affirms a prior
decision of the Department. Prior to making a determination not to
accept an appeal , a review will be made of the record by an
individual designated by the Board.
3. Filing an Appeal
a.
An appeal to the Board of Review from a decision of an
Administrative Law Judge must be on an appeal form provided by the
Department, or a written statement which includes:
(1) The name of the appellant,
(2) The name and social security number of the claimant in cases
involving benefit rights,
(3) The identification of the case on which the appeal is being
made,
(4)
The grounds upon which the appeal is made.
However, the
issues presented in the appeal are not limited to the issues
presented at the hearing.
Further, the review by the Board will
not be limited to the issues raised by the appeal. The appeal may
be accompanied by references to or excerpts from the record made
before the Administrative Law Judge.
R562-10d-3. Board of Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

1. Notice that An Appeal Has Been Filed
All
parties
entitled
to
receive
the
decision
of
the
Administrative Law Judge will receive notice from the Department
that an appeal has been filed with the Board of Review.
2. Consideration by the Board
a. The Board of Review will not take additional evidence. If
the Board determines that additional evidence offered by a party
was not available at the time of the hearing, the Board may remand
the matter to an Administrative Law Judge for further hearing. The
Board may also remand a matter for the taking of new evidence if,
in the discretion of the Board, such evidence is of particularly
significant importance that the Board determines its inclusion in
the record is necessary for proper administration of the Act.
b. At its discretion, the Board may also remand a case to an
Administrative Law Judge or Department representative for other
action as deemed appropriate.
3. Presentation of Argument
In its review of an appeal, the Board of Review may in its
discretion allow the parties to file written arguments.
When
written arguments are allowed, the parties will be granted 15 days
from the date of notification to submit their arguments. No other
argument will be allowed, unless the Board determines that
A-l

additional written argument is necessary to a proper understanding
of the appeal.
R562-10d-4. Notice of Decisions from the Board of Review.
1. A copy of the decision of the Board of Review, including an
explanation of the right to judicial review, will be promptly
delivered or mailed to each interested party.
2. In each case where the Board of Review declines to accept an
appeal, the findings of fact and decision of the Administrative Law
Judge will be deemed to be the findings and decision of the Board
of Review and will be subject to judicial review upon action
commenced within ten days after the decision of the Board of Review
declining acceptance of the appeal has become final.
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993 By The Michie Company

A-2

CONCLUSION TO REPLY BRIEF
The record on appeal clearly demonstrates that following the
initial hearing of Claimant, Karbakhsh case, there were no
evidentiary hearings where Petitioner could have presented
evidence in support of its request for its petition for approval
of fees.

It is also clear that the Board of Review considered

evidence adduced in the underlying case following the petition
for approval of fees as recited in its decision.

Respondents

references to the Utah Code are not applicable to a hearing on a
petition for fees.

There was no hearing conducted on the issue

of fees, nor was one available which would have met the
requirements of due process.

Petitioner requests that the Court

reverse the decision of the board of review and award Petitioner
attorney's fees of $4,3 00.00.

Alternatively, Petitioner requests

that decision of the Board of Review be reversed and that an
evidentiary hearing be conducted by an administrative law judge
on Petitioner's petition for its fees.
DATED this 16th Day of March 1994

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 16th
day of March, 1994, a copy of the foregoing Conclusion to Reply
Brief to the following:
EMMA R. THOMAS-4 681
K. ALLAN ZABEL-3598
Attorneys for Respondent
140 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84117
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